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Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: The 
Need for an International Standard Defining 
Mental Retardation 
Allison Freedman 
I.   INTRODUCTION  
¶1  Within the international community, there is a consensus against the imposition of 
the death penalty on individuals with mental retardation.1 The United States Supreme 
Court and several international human rights bodies have recognized that individuals with 
mental retardation should not be subject to the death penalty.2 Additionally, most 
countries maintain that individuals who are insane or mentally retarded are shielded from 
execution.3 However, reports of individuals with mental retardation who are facing the 
death penalty continue to surface.4  
¶2  One reason for this may be the lack of an international standard defining mental 
retardation.5 There is currently great variation between cultures in defining the level of 
                                                        
1 The terms “mentally retarded” and “mental retardation” are now rejected in the disability community and 
the term “intellectual disability” is favored instead. In fact, in 2010, President Barack Obama signed Rosa’s 
Law, which replaced the term “mental retardation” with “intellectual disability” in all federal education, 
health, and labor laws 20 U.S.C. § 1140 (2010). However, the language in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002), as well as many of the statutes referenced throughout this article use the term “mental retardation.” 
Therefore, in order to avoid confusion in what is already a semantically complex area, this article will use 
the term mental retardation. Use of this term is not intended to stigmatize individuals with what is now 
recognized to be intellectual disability. Additionally, while the semantics have changed, the definition of 
intellectual disability is identical to the definition of mental retardation. 
2 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315, 321 (holding that evolving standards of decency have produced a national 
consensus in opposition to the execution of individuals with mental retardation such that “death is not a 
suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal”); U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, The Question of the Death Penalty, ¶ 4(g), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/67 (Apr. 24, 2003), 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id=5021 [hereinafter Question of the Death Penalty] 
(urging countries “not to impose the death penalty on a person suffering from any form of mental disorder 
or to execute any such person”); U.N. ESCOR, Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards 
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary 
General, ¶ 89, U.N. Doc. E/2005/3 (Mar. 9, 2005), 
http://www.nswccl.org.au/docs/pdf/UNDoc_E_2005_3.pdf [hereinafter Report of the Secretary General] 
(suggesting that the safeguard to protect individuals with mental retardation from capital punishment will 
need to be reformulated to include any form of mental disorder). 
3 Report of the Secretary General, supra note 2, ¶ 88. 
4 Id. 
5 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. AND 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition/faqs-on-intellectual-
disability#.UmRYRxZhyMN (“The term intellectual disability covers the same population of individuals 
who were diagnosed previously with mental retardation in number, kind, level, type, duration of disability, 
and the need of people with this disability for individualized services and supports. Furthermore, every 
individual who is or was eligible for a diagnosis of mental retardation is eligible for a diagnosis of 
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mental functioning that constitutes retardation.6 Additionally, definitions of mental 
retardation vary widely from country to country, with some countries conflating mental 
illness with mental retardation and others completely excluding mental retardation from 
their definition.7 As a result, there is no way “to gauge the extent to which the widespread 
prohibition on the execution of the mentally retarded has in fact provided a safeguard for 
all those to whom it may apply in principle.”8 
¶3  Marvin Wilson’s story exemplifies the inconsistency in the application of the death 
penalty with regard to individuals with mental retardation. Marvin Wilson, a 54-year-old 
American male convicted of shooting and killing another man, had an IQ of 61 and even 
lower functioning levels. He struggled in school, dropped out after 10th grade, and had 
trouble performing the simplest tasks without assistance. A board-certified expert 
concluded that Marvin was mentally retarded, yet he was put to death in Texas on August 
7, 2012.9 
¶4  The international community condemns the execution of individuals with mental 
retardation, and many international human rights bodies recommend a ban on such 
executions. However, the recommendations fail to provide the international community 
with guidance on what constitutes mental retardation. Therefore, an international standard 
would help avoid executions occurring because of confusion and a lack of understanding 
revolving around what qualifies as mental retardation.  
¶5  Much recent scholarly research focuses on the lack of protection of individuals 
with mental illnesses and the need for such protection under the United States 
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.10 However, 
little attention has been given to the already existing categorical exclusion for individuals 
with mental retardation under the Eighth Amendment. Because individuals with mental 
retardation have theoretically been exempted from the death penalty, less time has been 
spent exploring the problems that have arisen in the wake of the theoretical exclusion. 
Scholars have given even less attention to the way the ban on executing individuals with 
mental retardation actually functions on the international stage. 
¶6  This article addresses the need for an international standard defining mental 
retardation so that the international consensus exempting individuals with mental 
retardation from the death penalty can be realized in practice. Part II provides an 
                                                                                                                                                                     
intellectual disability.”); Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation: Understanding 
the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 116, 116-17 
(2007) (“Increasingly, the term intellectual disability is being used instead of mental retardation . . . The 
term ‘intellectual disability’ covers the same population and renders the same individuals eligible for a 
diagnosis as those covered and rendered by ‘mental retardation.’”). 
6 ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 198 (4th ed. 
2008). 
7 See generally Death Penalty Worldwide Database, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC, 
http://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/ [hereinafter Death Penalty Worldwide Database]. 
8 HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 6, at 198. 
9 INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: Texas Stands Alone in Its Unusual Test of Mental Retardation and 
Exemption From Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/intellectual-disabilities-texas-stands-alone-its-unusual-test-mental-
retardation-and-exemption-execu.   
10 See, e.g., Robert Batey, Categorical Bars to Execution: Civilizing the Death Penalty, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 
1493 (2009); Liliana Lyra Jubilut, Death Penalty and Mental Illness: The Challenge of Reconciling Human 
Rights, Criminal Law, and Psychiatric Standards, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 353 (2007).  
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overview of the semantic nuances in the language surrounding mental retardation that 
have likely led to some of the confusion regarding the definition of mental retardation. 
Part III explores the ethical and moral justifications for exclusion of individuals with 
mental retardation from the death penalty. Part IV explores why, despite an international 
consensus to the contrary, individuals with mental retardation are still executed today. To 
illustrate the grave problems resulting from the varied definitions of mental retardation, 
Part IV also provides a case study of an individual who was recently sentenced to death 
despite being mentally retarded. Part V provides a survey of all the countries that 
currently use the death penalty and categorizes these countries by their definition of 
mental retardation, looking at countries that (a) define only mental illness without a 
separate provision for mental retardation; (b) conflate the definitions for mental 
retardation and mental illness; (c) differentiate between mental illness and mental 
retardation; and (d) provide no definition for either mental illness or mental retardation. 
Finally, Part VI recommends an international standard for the definition of mental 
retardation to help realize the international ban on the death penalty for individuals with 
mental retardation. Part VI also provides an overview of the penal codes of all countries 
still employing the death penalty and their definitions of mental retardation, and analyzes 
trends found within these penal codes to recommend this definition of mental retardation 
for the international community.  
II.   CONFUSION WITH COMMONLY USED TERMS 
¶7  To understand the importance of an international standard for the definition of 
mental retardation, one must first distinguish between the many terms often associated 
with mental deficiencies. At the broadest level, mental disability, mental disorder, and 
mental illness11 are often used as all-encompassing terms.12 For example, under the 
approach taken by the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual, commonly known as the DSM-5,13 a mental disorder is “a syndrome 
characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion 
regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or 
developmental processes underlying mental functioning.”14 However, the drafters noted, 
“that no definition adequately specifies precise boundaries for the concept of ‘mental 
                                                        
11 See infra text accompanying notes 18-22 (explaining that while mental illness is often used 
interchangeably with mental disorder or mental disease as an all-encompassing term for psychological 
illnesses affecting mental functioning, mental illness also has a narrower meaning directed specifically at 
individuals with process disorders).  
12 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF 
LIFE AND LIBERTY 2 (2006). 
13 See Intellectual Disability, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (2013), 
http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Intellectual%20Disability%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [hereinafter Intellectual 
Disability] (noting that the DSM-5 makes several changes from the previous edition including changing the 
term mental retardation to intellectual disability, moving the focus away from strict IQ cut-offs to focus on 
impairments of general mental abilities that impact adaptive functioning, and removing the age cut-off for 
the development of symptoms and instead indicating that the symptoms must begin during the 
developmental period). 
14 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 20 (5th ed. 
2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. 
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disorder.’”15 In fact, the drafters of the DSM have included more than three hundred 
syndromes and psychological patterns in their listing of mental disorders.16 Mental 
retardation is among the many syndromes and psychological patterns identified in the 
DSM-5.17 
¶8  Some clinicians also differentiate further, indicating that within mental disorders 
there are two types of disorders—process disorders and development disorders.18 Process 
disorders are generally called mental illnesses and they exist when the illness is a result 
of an event that changes an individual’s behavior.19 These mental illnesses are not a 
continuous state of mental illness, but generally cause episodes of the disease.20 
Development disorders, however, are inherent to the person and do not appear in 




¶9  Mental retardation is a more discrete concept than the sweeping term mental 
disorder. However, as this article will demonstrate, there are still inconsistencies in the 
definition of mental retardation in countries throughout the world as well as confusion 
regarding what constitutes mental retardation in contrast to mental disorder. 
¶10  In addition to the more medically laden terms, mental disorder and mental 
retardation, the terms “insane” and “incompetent” are used in the legal world. The 
Supreme Court of the United States held in Ford v. Wainwright that the Eighth 
Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishment precludes the execution of 
insane or incompetent inmates.23 However, while Ford established an exemption for the 
insane, the Court did not establish a definition of competence or insanity, nor did it 
provide procedures for determining these two concepts.24 Confusion about the terms 
insane and incompetent has also arisen because Ford gave wide discretion to the states in 
defining procedures for competency determinations.25 The uncertainty surrounding how 
to safeguard mentally incompetent individuals from execution has led to many proposals 
for reform, as well as suggestions for competency determination procedures.26 
¶11  The discussion surrounding the definitions of mental illness, mental retardation, 
and insanity is important for two reasons. First, it is necessary to understand the 
differences between these definitions in order to understand what this article addresses.27 
                                                        
15 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxi (4th ed. 
2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
16 SLOBOGIN, supra note 12, at 2.  
17 See DSM-5, supra note 14, at 20. 




22 See DSM-5, supra note 14, at 20; see also infra Part IV (providing a full discussion of the definition of 
mental retardation). 
23 See generally 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
24 Jubilut, supra note 10, at 356. 
25 Paula Shapiro, Are We Executing Mentally Incompetent Inmates Because They Volunteer to Die?: A 
Look at Various States’ Implementation of Standards of Competency to Waive Post-Conviction Review, 57 
CATH. U. L. REV. 567, 568-69 (2008). 
26 Id. 
27 This article is intended only to provide guidance on the definition of mental retardation and why an 
international standard for this particular category of mental disorder could help narrow the implementation 
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 Second, a discussion of these different terms illustrates why confusion has 
developed among countries throughout the world with regard to the definition of mental 
retardation. This background information, therefore, provides context for the discourse on 
mental retardation that follows. 
III.   WHY INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE 
DEATH PENALTY 
A.   The International Consensus is Against the Execution of Individuals with Mental 
Retardation 
¶12  An international consensus has arisen with regard to excluding individuals with 
mental retardation from the death penalty.
 
28 For example, in 2002 the United States 
Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia that executing individuals with mental 
retardation violated the United States Constitution’s Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment.29 Although a case with precedential value only in the United States, 
in reaching its decision the Court relied, in part, on an amicus curiae brief submitted by 
the European Union stating that “within the world community, the imposition of the 
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly 
disapproved.”30 
¶13  Several international human rights bodies have also recognized that individuals 
with mental retardation should not be subject to the death penalty. For example, in 1989, 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) passed a resolution 
recommending that member states take steps to “eliminate the death penalty for persons 
suffering from mental retardation or extremely limited mental competence, whether at the 
stage of sentence or execution.”31 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights32 
also adopted several resolutions urging member states not to subject individuals to the 
death penalty who are “suffering from any form of mental disorder.”33 Furthermore, in 
2005, ECOSOC suggested that the safeguard to protect individuals with mental 
disabilities be reformulated to be consistent with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 
urging that states not impose the death penalty on “a person suffering from any form of 
mental disorder.”34 The most recent recommendations encourage countries to exempt 
from execution individuals with any form of mental disorder, including those individuals 
with mental retardation.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
of the death penalty in countries around the world. This article will not attempt to define mental illness or 
discuss deficiencies in the legal standards for insanity. 
28 Report of the Secretary General, supra note 2, ¶ 88 (indicating most countries proclaim that individuals 
with mental retardation are shielded from the infliction of the death penalty). 
29 See generally 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
30 Id. at 316 n.21. 
31 U.N. ECOSOC, Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those 
Facing the Death Penalty, ¶ 1(d), U.N. Doc. E/1989/91 (May 24, 1989). 
32 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights was replaced by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council in 2006. 
33 Question of the Death Penalty, supra note 2, ¶ 4(g). 
34 Report of the Secretary General, supra note 2, ¶ 88. 
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B.   Executing Individuals with Mental Retardation Fails to Serve the Goals of the 
Criminal Justice System 
¶14  In addition to an international consensus on excluding individuals with mental 
retardation from the death penalty, the goals of the criminal justice system are ill served 
by the execution of individuals with mental retardation. As identified by courts, there are 
three main goals served by the death penalty—retribution, deterrence, and 
incapacitation.35  
¶15  The first goal, retribution, refers to the idea that offenders should be punished for 
committing crimes when they freely violate existing social rules.36 However, when 
looking at individuals with mental retardation, the idea of voluntarily violating social 
rules is more complicated. “People with severe mental disability are considered blameless 
and excused from crimes on insanity grounds, while those with lesser impairments, 
although convicted, might still be perceived as less than fully culpable and receive a 
reduced sentence.”37 In the United States case Atkins v. Virginia, the Court recognized 
that people with mental retardation have “diminished capacities to understand and 
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from 
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the 
reactions of others,” and therefore their execution does not “measurably contribute” to 
the goals of retribution or deterrence.38 In discussing the goal of retribution, the Court 
also noted that “the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not 
merit that form of retribution.”39  
¶16  The second goal, deterrence, focuses on consequences and refers to the idea that 
society should punish individuals up to the point where the marginal cost of additional 
punishment equals the marginal benefit in prevented crimes.40 This goal generally 
functions in one of two ways. First, increasing the certainty of punishment may deter 
potential offenders due to the risk of apprehension.41 Second, the type or severity of 
punishment may deter potential offenders if they weigh the consequences of their actions 
and decide the risk of punishment is too great.42 However, as explained by the Court in 
Atkins, because individuals with mental retardation have diminished capacities to 
understand and process information, the calculated component behind deterrence is 
unlikely to affect them. With regard to deterrence, the Court in Atkins specifically 
indicated that people with mental retardation are “less likely [to] process the information 
of the possibility of execution as a penalty” and are therefore less likely to be deterred by 
that information.43 
                                                        
35 SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 469 (8th ed. 
2007). 
36 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16 (3d ed. 2001). 
37 SLOBOGIN, supra note 12, at 14. 
38 536 U.S. at 318. 
39 Id. at 319. 
40 KADISH ET AL., supra note 35, at 92-93. 
41 VALERIE WRIGHT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF 
PUNISHMENT 2 (2010), 
http://www.asca.net/system/assets/attachments/1463/Deterrence_Briefing_.pdf?1290182850. 
42 Id. 
43 536 U.S. at 305. 
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¶17  The third goal, incapacitation, refers to the idea that by putting individuals in prison 
or subjecting them to the death penalty, these individuals will no longer be able to 
commit crimes like those for which they are being punished.44 Research indicates that the 
perceived dangerousness of the offender is the most influential factor in death penalty 
proceedings and therefore the reason some view permanent incapacitation as a goal of the 
death penalty.45 However, research on the subject does not support the idea that people 
with mental disorders, including mental retardation, are more dangerous.46 In fact, the 
base rate for violence among individuals with mental disorders is no higher, and is 
probably lower, than the base rate for offenders without mental disorders.47 Therefore, the 
idea that permanent incapacitation of individuals with mental retardation will help serve 
the goal of removing dangerous individuals from society lacks credibility; these 
individuals are no more dangerous than the average individual.  
C.   Global Human Rights Norms Point Towards Excluding Individuals with Mental 
Retardation from Execution 
¶18  International human rights law has also focused on the protection of the dignity and 
rights of individuals with mental disorders.48 The death penalty exception from a human 
rights law perspective has evolved because “[f]rom a human rights perspective, the 
intellectually disabled rank among the world’s most vulnerable and at-risk populations, 
both because they are different and because their disability renders them less able either 
to assert their rights or to protect themselves against blatant discrimination.”49 As Human 
Rights Watch stated, “because of their mental retardation, these men and women cannot 
understand fully what they did wrong and many cannot even comprehend the punishment 
that awaits them.”50 
D.   Procedural Hurdles Make it Difficult for Individuals with Mental Retardation to 
Present their Case in Court 
¶19  Individuals with mental disabilities also have a more difficult time presenting their 
case in court and are therefore more vulnerable to improper sentencing. For example, 
individuals with mental disabilities are less knowledgeable about their right not to answer 
questions without the advice of a lawyer, and less adept at negotiating pleas.51 Moreover, 
in court, juries sometimes interpret the actions of such individuals as demonstrating a 
lack of remorse, and therefore their mental deficiency is often an aggravating factor in 
capital sentencing rather than a mitigating factor.52 
                                                        
44 DRESSLER, supra note 36, at 16. 
45 SLOBOGIN, supra note 12, at 79. 
46 Id. at 80. 
47 Id. 
48 Jubilut, supra note 10, at 353.  
49 Id.  
50 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BEYOND REASON: THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL 
RETARDATION 2 (2001), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/. 
51 Id. at 22. 
52 SLOBOGIN, supra note 12, at 63. 
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IV.   WHY INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION ARE NOT, IN PRACTICE, ALWAYS 
EXCLUDED FROM THE DEATH PENALTY 
¶20  Despite the international consensus excluding individuals with mental retardation 
from the death penalty, the goals of the criminal justice system, and international human 
rights law being ill served by executing individuals with mental retardation, reports of the 
execution of such individuals throughout the world continue to surface.53 To determine 
why this is the case, it is helpful to look at both the United States as well as the 
international community.   
A.   The United States: Inconsistency Among the States 
¶21  In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court of the United States embraced two clinical 
definitions of mental retardation, one supplied by the American Association on Mental 
Retardation (now the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (AAIDD)) and the other supplied by the American Psychiatric Association in 
its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR).54 The Court 
held that states’ measures for mental retardation in capital cases would be constitutional 
as long as they generally conformed to these clinical definitions.55 The Court left “to the 
State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction 
upon [their] execution of sentences.”56 In so doing, the Court gave states discretion over 
the procedural aspects of the implementation of the categorical exemption, such as 
“whether determinations of mental retardation should be made by a judge or by a jury, 
whether determinations should occur before or after guilt-innocence trials, which party 
bears the burden of proof, and what entitles a mental retardation claim to an evidentiary 
hearing or bars it by procedural default.”57  
¶22  In response, states have developed a myriad of procedures. For example, some 
states leave the task of determining mental retardation to the jury, while others leave this 
task to the judge, and still others allow for such a determination to be made by either the 
                                                        
53 Report of the Secretary General, supra note 2, ¶ 88. 
54 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (citing AAIDD’s definition: “Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in 
present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing 
concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: 
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, 
functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18,” and The American 
Psychiatric Association’s definition: “The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly 
subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in 
adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, 
social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, 
leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental 
Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various 
pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous system . . . ‘Mild’ mental 
retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50–55 to approximately 70.”).  
55 Id. at 317 n.22.  
56 Id. at 317.  
57 John H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in 
Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 689, 693 (2009). 
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judge or jury.58 Some state legislatures have even refused to address the procedures for 
implementing Atkins altogether.59  
¶23  With substantial state discretion and a lack of procedures to guarantee the 
protections put in place by Atkins, the goal of exempting individuals with mental 
retardation from the death penalty cannot be realized in practice.60 This has proven to be 
true, as several states have taken the Court’s ruling allowing states to develop procedural 
rules as permission to deviate from the accepted definitions expounded by the Court.61 
The definitions accepted by the Court recognize that individuals with mental retardation 
generally have a wide variety of abilities and needs. Therefore, these recognized 
definitions do not allow for exclusion criteria, that is, criteria which would automatically 
exempt an individual from qualifying as mentally retarded.62 However, some courts have 
been found to apply exclusion criteria by stereotyping and incorrectly categorizing 
individuals.63 This has resulted in an improper application of Atkins, and the execution of 
individuals who qualify under the constitutional protection established in this case.64 
B.   The International Community: Inconsistency among Countries  
¶24  Like the United States, the international community has established a norm against 
the death penalty for individuals with mental retardation.65 Similarly, despite such a 
norm, there is much inconsistency among different countries in the application of the 
death penalty for people with mental retardation. Just as the United States’ categorical 
exemption for individuals with mental retardation has varied due to the lack of guidance 
in defining and applying procedural guidelines for determining which individuals classify 
as mentally retarded, the lack of a consistent definition for mental retardation in the 
international community has also resulted in inconsistent application of the exclusion of 
the death penalty for individuals with mental retardation throughout the world.66 
¶25  There are currently ninety-three countries that still allow the death penalty.67 Of 
these, thirty-seven include only mental illness in their definition of those excluded from 
the death penalty, sixteen conflate the terms mental illness and mental retardation, 
twenty-nine differentiate between mental illness and mental retardation, and eleven have 
                                                        
58 J. Amy Dillard, And Death Shall Have No Dominion: How to Achieve the Categorical Exemption of 
Mentally Retarded Defendants from Execution, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 961, 966 (2011). 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 965.  
61 Blume et al., supra note 57, at 691. 
62 Id. at 697. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Report of the Secretary General, supra note 2, ¶ 89.  
66 See generally Death Penalty Worldwide Database, supra note 7 (providing penal code and/or case law 
definitions of mental retardation and mental illness for all countries that maintain the death penalty; when 
analyzed together these definitions demonstrate inconsistency in defining mental retardation and therefore 
present inconsistencies in the application of the death penalty to individuals with mental retardation).  
67 See Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnesty.org/en/death-
penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries [hereinafter Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries] (listing 
countries that maintain the death penalty on the books). 
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no definition of mental illness or mental retardation in their penal code.68 Due to this wide 
variance in defining mental retardation, there is currently no consistent application of the 
exclusion of individuals with mental retardation from the death penalty. It is impossible, 
on a worldwide basis, “to gauge the extent to which the widespread prohibition on the 
execution of the mentally retarded has in fact provided a safeguard for all those to whom 
it might apply in principle.”69 
C.   An Exemplifying Case   
¶26  To demonstrate the inconsistency in the application of the death penalty with 
regard to individuals with mental retardation, it is helpful to look again at the case of 
Marvin Wilson. Marvin, a 54-year-old American male convicted of shooting and killing 
another man, had an IQ of 61 and even lower functioning levels. Although a board-
certified expert concluded that Marvin was mentally retarded, he was still put to death in 
Texas in 2012.70  
¶27  The fact that Marvin was executed in Texas is significant. Despite the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Atkins laying out specific guidelines for the definition of mental 
retardation, Texas has instituted an additional set of factors, called the “Briseño 
factors.”71 These factors allow for the execution of individuals with mental retardation if, 
among other factors, the court determines the criminal offense required forethought, 
planning, and complex execution.72 This case exemplifies the difficulties in allowing 
individual states to implement the ruling in Atkins and the problem with leaving the 
procedural application of the ruling on mental retardation to the states. 
¶28  Outside the United States, specific cases of the execution of individuals with 
mental retardation are harder to identify. This is in part because the mental functioning of 
prisoners on death row has not been evaluated in most countries.73 Moreover, because of 
the variation in the definitions for mental retardation, countries with definitions that fail 
adequately to protect individuals with mental retardation would not report executions of 
such individuals as a violation of the international consensus. Under these countries’ 
schemas, such individuals were not considered mentally retarded at the time of execution, 
and therefore did not meet the countries’ standards for retardation.74  
                                                        
68 See generally Death Penalty Worldwide Database, supra note 7 (these numbers are approximations 
based on an analysis of the penal code and/or case law definitions for mental retardation provided in the 
Database).  
69 HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 6, at 198.  
70 INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: Texas Stands Alone in Its Unusual Test of Mental Retardation and 
Exemption From Execution, supra note 9. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. For further critique of the Briseño factors see, e.g., Blume et al., supra note 57, at 710-14; Carol S. 
Steiker et al., Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons From Substance and Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation 
of Capital Punishment 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 721, 727-28 (2008). 
73 HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 6, at 198.  
74 Id. (noting that while the United States is the only country officially continuing to execute individuals 
with mental retardation, “there appears to be no common agreement on how severe such retardation must 
be to lead to acquittal or the imposition of a lesser sentence than death”).  
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V.   THE NUMBERS: DEFINITIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND MENTAL RETARDATION BY 
COUNTRY  
¶29  Despite the international consensus that individuals with mental retardation should 
not face the death penalty, the penal codes of countries that still employ the death penalty 
demonstrate that there is wide variation among countries in their definitions of mental 
retardation.75 This can lead to improper application of the international norm that 
individuals with mental retardation should not be executed. Therefore, it is important to 
understand the vast variance among countries’ definitions in order to understand why an 
international standard for the definition of mental retardation will help countries realize 
the already recognized international consensus against the execution of individuals with 
mental retardation. 
¶30  Of the ninety-three countries that officially retain the death penalty, some have 
abolished the death penalty in practice while keeping it on the books (de facto 
abolitionist), while others both retain the death penalty in their penal codes and also 
continue to use the death penalty in practice (retentionist).76 Countries that are de facto 
abolitionist retain the death penalty but have not executed anyone in the past ten years 
and are believed to have a policy or practice of not carrying out executions.77 There are 
currently thirty-five countries that are de facto abolitionist.78 Retentionist countries are 
those that have carried out an execution within the last ten years.79 There are currently 
fifty-eight retentionist countries.80 Whether retentionist or abolitionist in practice, because 
these countries officially retain the death penalty, the majority of their penal codes have 
language addressing mental disabilities. Therefore, in establishing an international 
standard for mental retardation, it is helpful to look at all ninety-three countries, 
regardless of the time frame in which they carried out their last execution.  
¶31  The ninety-three countries that officially retain the death penalty can be further 
classified into categories based on their definitions of mental illness and/or mental 
retardation to help conceptualize the current problems with the definitions surrounding 
                                                        
75 Compare BRUNEI PENAL CODE § 303 (stating that “individuals suffering from ‘abnormality of mind’ 
including ‘arrested or retarded development’ substantially impairing mental responsibility are not to face 
capital charges”) with LIBYA PENAL CODE arts. 78, 83, 84 (indicating that individuals with “a lack of 
capacity or volition” may have reduced sentences). 
76 Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, supra note 67.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. (listing de facto abolitionist countries: Algeria, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ghana, Grenada, Kenya, Laos, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nauru, Niger, Papua New Guinea, 
Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Tonga, Tunisia, and Zambia).   
79 Id.  
80 Id. (listing retentionist countries: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Botswana, Chad, China, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, 
Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, North Korea, 
Oman, Pakistan, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United States Of America, Viet Nam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe).  
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mental disabilities.81 These categories include: (1) countries that define only mental 
illness; (2) countries that conflate the definitions for mental illness and mental 
retardation; (3) countries that differentiate between mental illness and mental retardation; 
and (4) countries that provide no definition for either mental illness or mental retardation. 
A.   Countries Defining Only Mental Illness 
¶32  Thirty-seven countries maintain only a definition for mental illness with no 
provision for or reference to mental retardation.82 Almost all of these countries simply 
refer to individuals with “mental illness” or individuals that are “insane” or of “unsound 
mind,” failing to provide guiding factors for defining mental illness. Although this paper 
does not focus on the definition of mental illness, the countries that define only mental 
illness are important because their imprecise definition and lack of a separate provision 
for individuals with mental retardation indicate that such individuals may not be provided 
protections, such as exemption from the death penalty. These countries have neglected to 
identify the features particular to individuals with mental retardation that would likely 
afford them greater protections than a simple phrase such as “insane.” 
B.   Countries Conflating the Definitions for Mental Retardation and Mental Illness 
¶33  There are sixteen countries that conflate the definitions for mental illness and 
mental retardation.83 These countries fail to recognize the factors that differentiate 
individuals who are mentally retarded from those who are mentally ill. Countries conflate 
these terms in several different ways. Some countries use vague language such as “mental 
disorder,” “mental disease,” “mental defect,” “mentally deficient,” and “lacking 
capacity,” which does not explicitly fall into the category of mentally ill or mentally 
deficient. These terms also lack defining characteristics, which makes it unlikely that they 
can be applied consistently.84  
¶34  Although many of these countries use language that appears to include individuals 
with mental retardation, there is no indication that the definitions are applied 
systematically because they do not officially differentiate between mental illness and 
mental retardation. Without two separate provisions, one for mental retardation and 
another for mental illness, countries risk misapplication of the single definition, leaving 
individuals to guess whether the provision applies to individuals with mental retardation. 
                                                        
81 See generally Death Penalty Worldwide Database, supra note 7. The following categories and country 
lists are based on an analysis of the penal code and case law definitions of mental retardation provided in 
the Database. The categories are approximations of countries that fall within each category as the imprecise 
definitions and frequent conflation of mental illness and mental retardation make it difficult to definitively 
parse which countries fall within each category.   
82 These countries include: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Belarus, Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guyana, Iran, Japan, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Laos, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nauru, Niger, Saudi Arabia, Sierra 
Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Korea, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, and Vietnam.  
83 These countries include: Central African Republic, Egypt, India, Iraq, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, 
Maldives, Mongolia, Nigeria, Palestinian Authority, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
84 Countries using terms such as these include: Central African Republic, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Liberia, 
Malawi, Maldives, Mongolia, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
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¶35  Still other countries do not provide protections for individuals with mental 
retardation in their penal codes, but make reference to increased protections for these 
individuals in case law. For example, although the penal code in Papua New Guinea 
seems only to include mentally ill individuals, case law suggests that sophistication and 
mental capacity beyond mere sanity could be considered in sentencing.85 Although case 
law is better than no law on the subject, it is again unlikely that protections for 
individuals with mental retardation are being applied consistently without provisions in 
the penal codes of these countries.  
C.   Countries that Differentiate Between Mental Illness and Mental Retardation  
¶36  There are twenty-nine countries that differentiate between mental illness and 
mental retardation.86 Some of these countries also provide guidance as to what constitutes 
mental retardation, so that one can differentiate these categories in practice.87 However, 
many of these countries still lump the language for mental retardation and mental illness 
into the same provision without explicitly stating what constitutes mental retardation and 
what constitutes mental illness, which may cause confusion in practice. For example, the 
Brunei Penal Code states that “individuals suffering from ‘abnormality of mind’ 
including ‘arrested or retarded development’ substantially impairing mental responsibility 
are not to face capital charges.”88 Although the provision provides for individuals with 
abnormality of mind, likely referring to mentally ill individuals, as well as individuals 
with arrested or retarded development, likely referring to individuals with mental 
retardation, it is not entirely clear from the provision that Brunei intends to exclude all 
individuals with mental illness and mental retardation from capital punishment. Similarly, 
Afghanistan states that an individual who “lacks his senses and intelligence due to 
insanity or other mental diseases has no penal responsibility . . .”89 Again, while insanity, 
likely referring to the mentally ill, and mental disease, likely referring to people with 
mental retardation, are both encompassed in the definition, and clarifying language 
regarding lack of senses or intelligence is provided, it is not explicitly stated that mental 
retardation and mental illness are both provided for. Breaking the provision into two parts 
and placing them under different provisions in the penal code would help draw attention 
to the difference between mental illness and mental retardation and indicate that both are 
intended to be excluded from the death penalty.  
¶37  Furthermore, several of these countries simply use the words mental illness and 
mental retardation in their definitions, but provide no indication of what constitutes 
                                                        
85 Ume v. State, SCRA 10 of 1997, Supreme Court of Justice, May 19, 2006 (Papa N.G.), ¶ 74, 
http://www.paclii.org/pg/cases/PGSC/2006/9.html. 
86 These countries include: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Brunei, Cameroon, Cuba, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saint Lucia, 
South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United 
States of America, and Yemen. 
87 It is also important to differentiate between mental illness and mental retardation because the diagnoses 
are not mutually exclusive and some individuals can present with both disabilities, leading to a dual 
diagnosis. See, e.g., Information on Dual Diagnosis, NADD, http://thenadd.org/resources/information-on-
dual-diagnosis-2/.   
88 BRUNEI PENAL CODE, supra note 75, § 303. 
89 AFGHANISTAN PENAL CODE art. 67(1). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [2014 
 14
mentally ill and mentally retarded, simply substituting the two phrases for each other.90 
While this is important, as it indicates these countries recognize people with mental 
retardation as a set of individuals who should be afforded sentencing protections, without 
guidance in the definition as to the meaning of mental illness and mental retardation, one 
may easily conflate the two and subsequently misapply the provisions in practice, 
perhaps executing individuals with mental retardation because of a lack of understanding 
of what constitutes mental retardation. 
D.   Countries that Provide no Definition for Mental Illness or Mental Retardation 
¶38  The last category encompasses those countries that have no penal code language 
indicating that either individuals with mental illness or mental retardation are exempt 
from the death penalty. There are eleven countries in this category.91 Instituting an 
international standard for the definition of mental retardation could help these countries 
to recognize the importance of and be able to implement protections for individuals with 
mental retardation in the future.  
VI.   THE FIX: AN INTERNATIONAL STANDARD92  
A.   The Adoption of an International Standard Will Help 
¶39  Having identified the current problem surrounding individuals with mental 
retardation and the death penalty, the next step lies in identifying a solution. One possible 
solution exists in the adoption of an international standard defining mental retardation.93  
¶40  This solution comports with the primary goal of human rights standards as well as 
the procedural norms for when new human rights standards are most often created in 
practice. The foremost goal of a new human rights standard is “the protection of those 
                                                        
90 These countries include: Cuba, Indonesia, Qatar, Uganda, and United Arab Emirates. Compare CUBA 
PENAL CODE art. 20.1 (individuals are exempt from criminal liability or face diminished liability at 
sentencing if mental retardation substantially or completely impairs their ability to appreciate the 
consequences of their actions or to control their actions) (emphasis added), with CUBA PENAL CODE art. 
20.1 (individuals are exempt from criminal liability or face diminished liability at sentencing if mental 
disorder substantially or completely impairs their ability to appreciate the consequences of their actions or 
to control their actions) (emphasis added). 
91 These countries include: Bangladesh, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Grenada, 
Lesotho, North Korea, Pakistan, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Taiwan. 
Note that for Grenada and Saint Kitts and Nevis, no law in this area was located and therefore penal 
provisions for mental illness or mental retardation could exist. 
92 The definition expounded in this section has been adapted from a definition that was initially developed 
through a collaborative effort for the purposes of informing the deliberative process of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) as part of the representation of death row prisoner Virgilio 
Maldonado. 
93 The AAIDD recently proposed recommendations for the 11th edition of the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD-11), which is a classification system of all health conditions published by the World 
Health Organization (WHO). In these recommendations the AAIDD notes: “Maintaining a consistent 
terminology is crucial in ensuring fairness, accuracy, and consistency in and across countries in critical 
areas including clinical practice, teaching/training, research, population-based statistics reporting, and 
public health services.” Marc J. Tassé et al., AAIDD Proposed Recommendations for ICD-11 and the 
Condition Previously Known as Mental Retardation, 51 INTELL. AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 127, 
128 (2013). 
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who are not protected.”94 In practice, new human rights standards are most often created 
to fill a gap in protection.95 In many cases, even when existing instruments provide 
protection in certain respects, a new or more developed instrument may be needed to 
enable members of a group to more effectively protect their rights and to clarify the 
duties of states.96 Moreover, even if a right has been included in an instrument, there is 
often no mechanism to monitor and enforce its compliance, depriving victims of an 
adequate remedy.97  
¶41  The lack of a consistent definition for mental retardation in the death penalty 
context is one such gap. While penal codes in many countries identify the need for 
exclusion of individuals with mental retardation from the death penalty, a new instrument 
is needed to afford people with mental retardation the protections identified by the 
international community. 
¶42  Since many international standards do not create binding precedent and the process 
of creating new standards can be slow, some are skeptical of the usefulness of 
international standards in practice.98 However, when supported by public advocacy, the 
influence of such standards, even when not binding, can promote reform of domestic law 
and practices, provide benchmarks for measuring the performance of state institutions, 
and improve accountability and redress available to victims.99 Furthermore, as laws 
progress and cultural values evolve, international law must adapt to encompass these 
changes and gaps that may be created by this evolution.100 While laws and cultural norms 
have evolved to expound an international norm against the death penalty for people with 
mental retardation, the protections afforded to these individuals are not realized in 
practice. Therefore, an international standard is needed to address the gap between the 
international consensus and the reality on the ground. 
B.   What the Recommended International Standard Should Include 
¶43  Although only a select number of the ninety-three countries using the death penalty 
provide language helpful for defining mental retardation, it is useful to look at the 
language of these select countries to see how they have addressed defining mental 
retardation. In looking at a number of different countries’ language for defining mental 
retardation, one can create a definition that not only encompasses the most important 
facets of mental retardation, but also employs language broad enough to encompass all 
individuals with mental retardation. This definition must not, however, be so broad that it 
fails to provide guidance as to which individuals qualify as mentally retarded. 
¶44  Surveying the language on mental retardation suggests the definition should 
include several features: (1) language concerning mental incapacity with regard to 
cognitive functioning; (2) language regarding how an individual’s mental defect 
                                                        
94 INT’L COUNCIL ON HUM. RTS. POLICY, HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS: LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE 62 
(2006), http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/31/120b_report_en.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS 
STANDARDS]. 
95 Id. at 7. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 8. 
98 Id. at 3. 
99 Id. at 4. 
100 Id. at 3. 
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originated; (3) language regarding the extent of the mental defect; and (4) language 
describing the ways in which a mental defect may affect an individual’s functioning.101  
1. Mental Incapacity: Cognitive Functioning 
¶45  As noted previously, many countries do not explicitly define mental incapacity and 
simply state that individuals are “mentally disordered,” “mentally defective,” of 
“abnormal mind,” and “in a state of mental disturbance.” Because these terms do not 
provide guidance as to their meaning, it is important to further define mental 
incapacity.102 
¶46  Several countries define mental incapacity with reference to cognitive deficits or 
intellectual impairment. Some countries that encompass these ideas in their definitions 
include: Brunei, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Thailand, and the United States. Thailand 
specifically refers to a “lack of intelligence,”103 while Brunei states that “[i]ndividuals 
suffering from abnormality of mind” including “arrested or retarded development 
substantially impairing mental responsibility are not to face capital charges.”104 
Guatemala uses the phrase “incomplete or retarded mental development,”105 and Ethiopia 
discusses “delayed development or deterioration of the mental faculties.”106 Finally, the 
AAIDD in the United States says that “[i]ntellectual disability is a disability characterized 
by significant limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior, which 
covers many everyday social and practical skills. This disability originates before the age 
of 18.”107   
2. How the Mental Defect Originated 
¶47  Since mental retardation can originate from birth or can manifest later in life due to 
a traumatic event or disease, recognizing that there is not simply one way mental 
retardation can originate is an important aspect identified by only a few countries. 
Countries like Belize provide the most helpful language for this aspect of the definition. 
Belize asserts that an individual is not criminally liable while suffering from 
“abnormality of mind [due to] arrested or retarded development or any inherent causes or 
                                                        
101 This survey was completed by reviewing the definitions of mental retardation and/or mental illness in 
all ninety-three countries that still officially employ the death penalty.  
102 The definition of mental incapacity should be distinguished from definitions of insanity. While insanity 
is a legal term of art which implicates whether or not an individual can be found guilty, an individual with a 
mental incapacity could potentially be found guilty but would receive a lesser punishment. See generally 
HENRY F. FRADELLA, FROM INSANITY TO DIMINISHED CAPACITY: MENTAL ILLNESS AND CRIMINAL EXCUSE 
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2007). This article advocates for the exclusion of the death penalty as 
a possible punishment even if such an individual is found guilty. Moreover, many countries use the term 
insanity interchangeably with mental illness. Neither of these terms is addressed as part of the definition of 
mental retardation and should not be confused with the goal of defining it. 
103 THAILAND CRIMINAL CODE art. 78. 
104 See BRUNEI PENAL CODE, supra note 75, § 303. 
105 GUATEMALA PENAL CODE arts. 23, 26. 
106 ETHIOPIA CRIMINAL CODE arts. 48, 49, 177, 180. 
107 Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, 
http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#.UmcJeRCtyno [hereinafter AAIDD].  
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caused by disease or injury . . .”108 In the United States, the AAIDD also indicates that for 
an individual with mental retardation, the “disability originates before the age of 18.”109 
3. Extent of the Mental Defect: Partial or Complete 
¶48  Many countries’ definitions also address the degree to which an individual is able 
to understand or comprehend his or her actions. Countries generally define such 
understanding in one of two ways.  
¶49  Some countries view an individual’s comprehension as a diminished or 
substantially impaired awareness, understanding, or appreciation of their actions or the 
consequences of such actions. Brunei is the country which best exemplifies this 
distinction. Brunei uses the language “substantially impairing mental responsibility.”110  
¶50  Other countries require that an individual be completely unable to understand or 
comprehend the nature of his or her actions. This is a more stringent standard because it 
is not enough for an individual to have only a diminished understanding, but instead the 
individual must be completely unable to understand or comprehend his or her actions. 
Some countries that use this distinction include Belarus and Liberia. Belarus states that 
one must be “deprived of understanding”111 and Liberia asserts that an individual must 
“lack[] capacity to understand.”112 
¶51  Still other countries include both diminished comprehension and complete inability 
to understand in their definition. For example, both Cameroon and Qatar differentiate 
between “partial incapacity” and “total incapacity.”113   
4. How the Mental Defect Affects Functioning  
¶52  Several countries also address the ways a mental defect may affect an individual’s 
functioning. Some such countries include Libya and the United States. Libya says that 
individuals with “a lack of capacity or volition” may have reduced sentences.114 The 
                                                        
108 Criminal Code §§ 26, 118 (2000) (Belize). See also GAMBIA CRIMINAL CODE art. 192A(1), (3) (stating 
that a person found guilty of murder and found to be “suffering from such abnormality of mind [whether 
arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind, or any inherent causes or induced by 
disease or injury] . . . is not sentenced to death . . .”); Offenses Against the Person Act, § 5(1) (2005) (Jam.) 
(asserting that a person suffering from “abnormality of mind” due to “a condition of arrested or retarded 
development or any inherent cause induced by disease or injury . . .” cannot be convicted of capital 
murder); ST. LUCIA CRIMINAL CODE § 90(1) (indicating that the death penalty cannot be applied to those 
“suffering from such mental disorder [whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development 
of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury] . . .”). 
109 See AAIDD, supra note 107. While the AAIDD requires mental retardation to originate before the age 
of 18, the DSM-5, published by the APA, recently removed such an age cut-off from its definition, opting 
instead to require the symptoms of the disability to originate during the developmental period. DSM-5, 
supra note 14. See also infra note 117 (noting that this article does not advocate for a particular age cutoff 
because it may be difficult for some countries to measure these cutoffs and may also draw an arbitrary line 
after which individuals will not be afforded necessary protections). 
110 See BRUNEI PENAL CODE, supra note 75, § 303.  
111 PENAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS art. 92. 
112 LIBERIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 6.1. 
113 CAMEROON PENAL CODE § 78, no. 65-LF-24 (1965) and no. 67-LF-1 (1967); QATAR PENAL CODE art. 
54. 
114 LIBYA PENAL CODE, supra note 75, arts. 78, 83, 84. 
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American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities in the United States 
indicates that not only does a disability affect intellectual functioning but it also impacts 
adaptive behavior, which may cover many everyday social and practical skills.115 
C.   A Recommended International Standard for the Definition of Mental Retardation 
¶53  After surveying the language of the most relevant penal codes116 providing 
guidance on a definition for mental retardation, it becomes possible to develop a 
recommended international standard for the definition of mental retardation. The 
recommended standard aims to provide enough guidance for countries to determine who 
qualifies as mentally retarded while leaving the definition broad enough to allow for 
accommodation of the variance in resources and access to health information in different 
countries. This may require varying methods of proof and procedures.117 However, while 
countries may use various methods of proof, this definition is intended to be exclusive; 
the use of varying methods of proof does not confer the ability for countries to change, 
add to, or diminish the definition, which would effectively invalidate the international 
standard. The recommended international definition of mental retardation is:  
¶54  A significant cognitive disability or arrested development of the mental faculties, 
whether hereditary or acquired, that substantially impairs judgment, reasoning, volition, 
or adaptive behavior. 
¶55  An individual who meets this definition should not be subject to the death penalty. 
This definition encompasses the ideas of mental incapacity with regard to cognitive 
ability, how the defect originated, the extent of the mental defect, and the ways in which 
the defect may affect an individual’s functioning.118 
¶56  The definition begins by recognizing that an individual may have either a 
significant cognitive disability or arrested development of the mental faculties. This 
captures the cognitive functioning aspect of mental incapacity while recognizing that the 
type and severity of the cognitive deficit may vary. Including “significant cognitive 
                                                        
115 See AAIDD, supra note 107.  
116 The most relevant penal codes provide guidance on one or more of the four categories developed in Part 
VI, Section B above. 
117 Due to the varying economic circumstances of countries that could employ this standard, the 
recommended standard lays out characteristics for identifying an individual as mentally retarded while 
leaving the method of proof to vary by country. Some countries will likely use diagnostic testing while 
others may use only historical or anecdotal evidence. The evidence used in different countries will be that 
which is most appropriate for a country, depending on factors such as variance in resources. Moreover, 
because the combination of different types of evidence, rather than strict cutoffs in age or mental 
competency tests, is likely most helpful for proving mental retardation, resource poor countries unable to 
provide the accused with the resources for sophisticated testing may still have a variety of methods with 
which the accused may prove mental retardation. Differing methods of proof do not, however, diminish the 
importance of a universal definition for mental retardation, since it is the characteristics of individuals with 
mental retardation which need most to be identified, understood, and widely accepted. 
118 The AAIDD recently recommended a definition for intellectual disability, formerly known as mental 
retardation: “A disorder of intellectual disability is a condition characterized by significant limitations in 
intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior, originating during the developmental period.” Tassé, supra 
note 93, at 129. This definition requires that an intellectual disability originate during the developmental 
period and does not recognize that intellectual disability can be caused by trauma or environmental factors 
that cause symptoms to develop later in life. Therefore, while this definition is a step in the right direction, 
the recommended definition in this article is still preferable. 
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disability” encompasses the sentiment in countries like Thailand that refer to a “lack of 
intelligence,”119 while including “arrested development of the mental faculties” references 
the sentiment in countries like Guatemala that refer to an “incomplete or retarded mental 
development.”120 This distinction is important as it provides protections for a wide range 
of individuals with mental retardation. 
¶57  The next part of the definition, “whether hereditary or acquired,” helps to clarify 
that while mental retardation is an ongoing mental condition, an individual can be born 
mentally retarded or can also become mentally retarded through disease, trauma, or 
environmental factors. This concept is expressed in the definitions of countries such as 
Belize and the United States. Belize indicates that an individual is not criminally liable 
while suffering from “abnormality of mind [due to] arrested or retarded development or 
any inherent causes or caused by disease or injury . . .”121 Moreover, the United States 
recognizes that mental retardation can develop from environmental factors such as lead or 
mercury poisoning or extreme neglect as a child.122 This phrase also assists in setting 
mental retardation apart from mental illness, since mental illnesses more often manifest 
in temporary episodes.  
¶58  The phrase “substantially impairs” encapsulates the degree of mental impairment. 
While some countries, such as Liberia and Mongolia, require complete mental 
impairment, others, such as Brunei, require only diminished mental capacity. The 
recommended definition includes individuals who exhibit substantial impairment so as 
not to exclude individuals with mental retardation who are mentally retarded but may not 
exhibit the most extreme form of mental retardation. In practice, it can be difficult to 
determine the extent of an individual’s impairment without mental acuity tests,123 so this 
part of the definition also helps accommodate this difficulty. 
¶59  Reference to an individual’s judgment, reasoning, volition, or adaptive behavior 
encompasses the way mental retardation affects daily functioning. This brings together 
definitions from countries such as Libya, which indicates that individuals with “a lack of 
capacity or volition” may have reduced sentences,124 and the United States, which 
includes the concept of limitations in adaptive behavior that cover many everyday social 
and practical skills.125 Including impairment in judgment, reasoning, volition, and 
adaptive behavior helps clarify that the effects of mental retardation can vary in different 
individuals. 
D.   What is Not Included in the Definition and Why 
¶60  While the recommended definition aims to be specific enough to provide guidance 
for deciding if an individual qualifies as mentally retarded, there are several factors 
addressed in various countries’ definitions, which this article purposely does not include 
                                                        
119 See THAILAND CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 103, art. 78. 
120 See GUATEMALA PENAL CODE, supra note 105, arts. 23, 26.  
121 Criminal Code (Belize), supra note 108, §§ 26, 118. 
122 Mental Retardation, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL DISORDERS, http://www.minddisorders.com/Kau-
Nu/Mental-retardation.html#b. 
123 See infra text accompanying notes 127-129 (noting that many countries do not have the ability to 
administer mental acuity tests, so reference to these tests has been left out of the definition). 
124 LIBYA PENAL CODE, supra note 75, arts. 78, 83, 84. 
125 See AAIDD, supra note 107. 
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in the recommended definition. These factors include: (1) a specific age before which an 
individual must manifest mental retardation; (2) a specific IQ score or outcome on a 
mental health test for competency; and (3) a time frame in which an individual must 
manifest mental retardation. Including these factors may make it difficult for countries to 
agree on the international standard or may put strain on resource poor countries that 
employ the definition. A definition including such provisions would not likely be adopted 
on an international scale and could prove difficult for many countries to implement if 
adopted at large.  
¶61  While countries such as the United States include an age or time period before 
which an individual must manifest mental retardation,126 it may not be possible to 
determine the precise age at which an individual manifested mental retardation. 
Furthermore, some countries may not have a system of health records or a healthcare 
system to which all individuals have access. It may, therefore, be impossible to determine 
the age at which an individual first showed signs of mental retardation. Moreover, some 
individuals may become mentally retarded as a result of a traumatic injury, disease, or 
environmental factors, in which case the age requirement would improperly create a 
barrier to protection of these individuals.  
¶62  Some countries implement mental health tests to determine the competency of the 
accused.127 While these tests can be helpful, they may be difficult to implement, 
especially in resource poor countries. For example, the Judicial Committee of Trinidad 
and Tobago indicated that “there was a shortage of qualified forensic psychiatrists in 
certain Caribbean countries and that this meant that the mental health of defendants in 
murder cases was not routinely assessed either by the State or the defen[s]e.”128 
Additionally, creating a cutoff on mental health tests such as those measuring IQ draws 
an arbitrary line, excluding individuals who may still manifest symptoms of mental 
retardation from receiving protections.129  
¶63  Finally, while some countries provide protections for the mentally deficient only at 
certain junctures during a proceeding, these countries have misconstrued the 
characteristics of mental retardation. Since mental retardation is an ongoing mental 
deficiency, any reference to a time frame (e.g. during interrogations, trial, sentencing, or 
post-conviction) during which an individual must manifest mental retardation only 
confuses the issue and has therefore been left out of the definition. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
¶64  Despite a consensus within the international community against the imposition of 
the death penalty on individuals with mental retardation, reports of capital punishment 
                                                        
126 Id. (noting that in the United States, the AAIDD requires that an intellectual disability originates during 
the developmental period).  
127 See, e.g., INT’L FEDERATION FOR HUM. RTS., THE DEATH PENALTY IN THAILAND 20-21 (2005), 
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Thailand411-2.pdf (indicating that the law requires prison officials to 
conduct thorough examinations of the mental status of each and every prisoner condemned to death); 
AAIDD, supra note 107 (noting that IQ tests are used in the United States to help determine mental 
competency).  
128 Report of the Secretary General, supra note 2, ¶ 88. 
129 See, e.g., AAIDD, supra note 107 (asserting that, in the United States, individuals with an IQ of 70, or 
in some cases as high as 75, have limited intellectual functioning). 
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being imposed on individuals with mental retardation continue to surface. One 
explanation for this is the lack of an international standard defining mental retardation.  
¶65  There is currently great variation between countries in defining the level of mental 
functioning that constitutes retardation. Moreover, the semantic nuances in the language 
relating to mental retardation have likely contributed to the confusion surrounding the 
definition of mental retardation. Definitions of mental retardation vary widely from 
country to country, with some countries defining only mental illness, some countries 
conflating the definitions for mental retardation and mental illness, other countries 
differentiating between mental illness and mental retardation, and still others providing 
no definition for either mental illness or mental retardation. 
¶66  One solution to this inconsistency is to provide an international standard for the 
definition of mental retardation to be used by all countries. By reviewing and identifying 
trends within the penal codes of all countries maintaining a definition of mental 
retardation in the context of the death penalty, this article recommends an international 
standard for the definition of mental retardation. Such a standard would provide guidance 
and help avoid executions occurring because of confusion and a lack of understanding 
regarding what constitutes mental retardation.  
 
